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Abstract: This paper investigates the impacts of institutions on the performances of enterprises in Vietnam. The result 
obtained from the quantitative research method shows that the criteria on institutions do affect the performances of 
enterprises in Vietnam; while some criteria have positive impacts, others negatively affect them. Moreover, the 
improvement in the quality of economic institutions will lead to the differences in the performances among different 
types of enterprises. More specifically, improving economic institutional quality will result in higher increases in the 
revenues and added values of state-owned enterprises than those of FDI enterprises. Similarly, the improvement also 
leads to the higher increase in private enterprises' revenues but lower increases in their added values and added value 
ratios compared to those of FDI enterprises. However, there is no difference in the impact of institutional quality 
improvement on the before-tax earnings of different types of enterprises. Based on the research's result, the paper 
proposes some suggestions to improve the quality of economic institutions, and thus improve enterprises' 
performances and success, on all three aspects including "rules", "players" and "implementation procedures". 
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IMPACTS OF INSTITUTIONS ON THE PERFORMANCES OF 
ENTERPRISES IN VIETNAM 




In the three decades from “Doi Moi”2 1986 to 2015, the economy of Vietnam has 
been developing amazingly, at an average annual growth rate of 6.5% (General Office of 
Statistics, 2015); and enterprises are the main source contributing to the gross domestic 
products (GDP) of Vietnam. According to Schumpeter (1935, 1942), enterprises play an 
important role in developing ideas and new technologies, increasing demands by providing 
new products and services, and most importantly, creating new jobs. Enterprises and other 
economic organizations are alleged to have sources to invest in services and new 
technologies, which help improves the standard of living. Thus, enterprises become the 
foundation for economic growth. 
In addition, economists believe that one of the most important factors that 
determine the successes of enterprises is the institution. North (1990) showed that different 
institutional qualities would lead to different development results. In an innovative 
institutional environment, enterprises had a good condition to develop well-known brand 
name products and helped create national brand names. Similarly, the compliance with 
laws and rules, especially regulations on property rights, in an environment of good quality 
would encourage investors to invest in technology innovations and product improvements 
(Baumol, 1990). Moreover, Rodrik (2007) supposed that if there was not a good 
institutional environment with property rights protection system and good authorities, 
enterprises would not be able to operate well. Porter (2008) also believed that the 
economic institutional environment was the factor that directly affected enterprises' 
productivity and helped enterprises achieve the highest level of productivity and 
innovation. Alternatively, according to Johan (2015), good institutional quality created a 
favorable condition for enterprises' productivity improvement and growths. 
In short, the economic institution plays an important role in the performances of 
enterprises. In Vietnam, there have been some researchers on this relationship; however, 
they still have some limitations. Thus, I analyze the impact of institutions on the 
performances of enterprises in Vietnam 
This paper aims at analyzing the impacts of institutions on performances of 
enterprises. Empirical results will provide important evidence for policymakers to adopt 
                                                          
1
 Foreign Trade University, Vietnam 
2
 “Doi Moi” is the name given to the economic reforms initiated in 1986 with the goal of transforming the 
economy of Vietnam from a centrally planned one into a socialist-oriented market economy.  
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solutions for improving the economic institution in order to create the incentives for 
enterprises to enhance performance productivities which bring success and growth to 
enterprises. Specifically, the paper will answer the following questions: i) how institutions 
affect firm performance? ii) Does institutional reform make the performance of domestic 
enterprises higher increases than that of FDI enterprises? The result of this research will be 
a crucial principle for policy-makers to improve the institutional environment, attract more 
foreign investors, enhance productivity and firm performance and boost the success of 
firms. 
2. Literature review on institution 
Over the last three decades, there have been many studies about the relationship 
between economic institutions and economic efficiency. North (1981, 1989, 1990) 
emphasized the role of institutions, especially the regulations on contract implementation 
and property right protection, in creating incentives that improve the economic growth. 
Similarly, North and Weingast (1989) believed that close and stable establishment of 
property rights was the key factor for the development of western countries; and it also 
stimulated economic growth via creating incentives for accumulations and innovations.  
Helpman (2008) also shared this opinion. However, the drawback of these studies is that 
they did not show the causation between economic institutions and economic efficiency. In 
reality, reverse causality is totally possible as economic growth will provide resources and 
create demands for better institutional quality and vice versa. Other studies by Keefer 
(1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), 
Rodrik et al. (2004) and Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) have shown that institutional quality 
has the large causal effect on economic development. However, the opinion about the 
causal relationship between economic institutions and economic efficiency was not 
supported in the study by Glaeser et al (2004).  
Moreover, the paper by Acemoglu et al (2005a) suggested that economic institution 
is the key factor determining the success and prosperity of nations and regions. In other 
words, the quality of economic institutions is much more important than geography, 
culture and managing capability (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
Based on the role of institutions in the overall economy, many scholars have 
developed the idea to investigate the role of economic institutions in enterprises. Some to 
be mentioned are papers by Hayek (1973, 1976a, 1979a), Euken (1940, 1992), Buchanan 
(1991) and Casson (1993) emphasized the key role of economic institutions in exploring 
useful knowledge and organizing the exploitation of sources of capital, labor, skills, and 
raw materials, and creating increasing outputs. In the other hand, Hoskisson et al (2000) 
indicated that the role of economic institutions in the economy was to reduce transaction 
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cost and information cost, to ensure property rights and to establish a stabilized 
environment to encourage interactions among subjects. Lawful regulations and official 
economic institutions were the foundation for business strategies of enterprises (Oliver, 
1997; Peng, 2000) and thus, affected firms' operations and productivities (Scott, 1995). 
Moreover, a research by World Bank (2002) showed that in a country that has the 
good economic institution, risks arising from transactions in the market could be managed 
and thus, firms' performance productivities and abilities to make the profit would be 
enhanced. Accordingly, the role of economic institutions concentrated on creating a 
favorable business environment. Boettke et al (2003) focused on how enterprises can 
stimulate the economy. They suggested that "economic growth, driven by 
entrepreneurship, cannot be explained without the reference to institutions" (p.3). 
Similarly, Bowen (2008) also emphasized that "the nature of a country's institutions may 
contribute to economic growth, not only by creating conditions supportive of 
entrepreneurial activity but also by helping to direct entrepreneurial efforts toward 
particular types of activity" (p.762). 
In addition, according to economists specializing in transaction costs (Coase, 1937 
and Williamson, 1985) under an economic institution that provided a behavior framework 
to reduce the randomness in the transactions among firms, transaction cost was clear and 
low, then enterprises tended to make long-term investments and focus on creativeness and 
inventions. On the contrary, under an economic institution where transaction costs were 
implicit and non-transparent (information searching, bribe, unofficial costs, high and 
undetermined time cost of transactions), enterprises tend to invest in the short terms or 
invest less. 
Most of later empirical studies support the opinion that economic institutions are 
positively correlated with enterprises' performances. Hallward – Dreimeier et al (2006, 
p.1514) showed that an enterprise' ROA had the positive correlation with rapid land 
clearance, reliable infrastructure and good financial services using a sample of 1500 
Chinese enterprises in 2006. Similarly, Ward et al (2010) investigated the impact of 
economic institutions on firms' success in Philipines. The result indicated that when 
economic institutions were improved, the gross profit of firms would increase by several 
percents. An economy whose economic institutions are weak will prevent its enterprises 
from entering the market (Djankov et al, 2002). 
In addition, Lasagni et al. (2012) investigated the effect of the quality of economic 
institutions in different provinces on the ratio of revenue over inputs (capital and labor) of 
4,000 firms in Italy in 2008. The result showed that economic institutions positively 
affected the ratio between revenue and inputs of enterprises and that as a result of better 
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quality of economic institutions in the North compared to those of the South, the 
performances of enterprises in the North were also better than those in the South. 
Recently, Johan (2015) studied the effect of institutional quality on the productivity 
and growth of 16,105 firms in 42 developing countries using a sample combining 
institutional quality data from the survey of experts from the University of Gothenburg and 
enterprise data from the World Bank Enterprises Survey. The result of this study confirms 
that good economic institutional quality is a condition for enterprises to increase 
productivity and growth. 
In opposition to these findings, Beck et al. (2005), based on World Bank's World 
Business Environment Survey, studied the impact of economic institutions on revenue 
growth rates of 4,000 enterprises in 54 countries. The result showed that economic 
institutional factors did not affect the revenue growth rate of firms and the main factor 
affecting revenue growth rate was the size of the business. However, for the group of small 
or newly established businesses, economic institutions had a great impact on their 
performance. 
Thus, over the past three decades, there have been numerous theoretical and 
empirical studies on the impact of economic institutions on the performance of firms. 
However, most empirical studies use cross-sectional data, which causes limitations such as 
small sample size, biased estimation due to unobserved variables, and lack of findings of 
intertemporal effect. Using panel data to analyze can overcomes that limitation because 
panel data contain information on both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of 
the entities may allow one to control the effects of missing or unobserved variables.  
In Vietnam, there are some studies on the role of institutions in the performance of 
firms. The first to be mentioned is the study by Tran Thi Bich et al. (2009) which 
investigated the impact of institutional change on labor productivity of non-state 
enterprises in Vietnam from 2005 to 2006. The paper uses quantitative research 
methodology with panel data pairing from two sets of data: the Vietnamese Enterprise 
Survey and the Provincial Competitiveness Indices (PCI) dataset. Research result showden 
that improvements in the provision of market information support, safe land use, and labor 
training had a positive impact on corporate performance. In contrast, weaknesses in the 
judicial system and administrative reform would hinder the growth of enterprises. 
However, the study does not have a clear theoretical model, and the model studied in this 
paper is based on the results of relevant studies (Carlier and Tran, 2005; Kane et al., 2007; 
Malesky, 2004). The period for the study was only 2 years and the paper only investigated 
non-state enterprises. 
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In a paper that studied the relationship between the export strategy and the business 
performance of small and medium private enterprises and the extent to which local 
economic institutions influenced the relationship, Nguyen Van Thang et al. (2013) pointed 
out that the improvement of economic institutional indicators will increase the efficiency 
of small and medium enterprises. Specifically, this study also used quantitative research 
methodology with panel data pairing from two sets of data which were the Vietnam 
Enterprise Survey and the Provincial Competitiveness Indices dataset. However, this study 
did not have a clear theoretical model, and it is based only on the results of related studies 
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Estrin et al., 2008). The study used data of an only 2-year 
period (2005-2006) and is only for small and medium private enterprises. Thus, although 
the paper studied the impact of the economic institution on business performances, it was 
carried out on a small sample size (the study of each province, city, sector, and type of 
enterprise), and thus it is not representative for the whole economy. 
On the other hand, the Asia Pacific Institute of Management and T & C Consulting 
(2014) studied the impact of corruption on the development of enterprises using both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. The quantitative study was conducted using 
the VCCI PCI dataset and the GSO Enterprise Survey from 2009 to 2011. The study result 
showed that enterprises spent a large amount of money every year on informal charges. 
Most firms paid a "lubricant" charge because they thought it's a "play rule" (the rules do 
not necessarily coincide with the law). The informal charges associated with growth are 
only in the group of enterprises that have efficient businesses and the impact of informal 
charges is greater for new firms. Finally, corruption reduces the efficiency of enterprises’ 
performances. This research incurs limitations as it used only one indicator of institutional 
quality and a short period of study (3 years). 
In summary, there have not been many studies on the impact of economic 
institutions on the performance of enterprises in Vietnam and their results still incur 
limitations. Specifically, the researchers are conducted just for one sector, one type of 
firms and one size of firms and one geographic area and thus it is not representative of the 
whole economy. 
In this paper, we study the role of economic institutions in the performances of 
enterprises in all sectors, geographical areas, and of all enterprise sizes and types. Thus, 
this study can represent the whole economy of Vietnam. The paper will compare the 
impacts of the economic institutions on the performances of enterprises among different 
types of ownership, in a consecutive period of 9 years (2006 – 2014). Many papers around 
the world indicate that for different types of enterprise (different types of ownership), the 
effects of economic institutions vary greatly in terms of access to capital, technology, and 
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access to global market; thus, institutions affect the different enterprises’ productivities 
differently (Angelucci et al., 2002; Estrin et al., 2009). Nigel et al. (2010) argued that 
economic institutions strongly influenced the operation of state-owned and private 
enterprises rather than FDI enterprises. 
3. Economic institutions in Vietnam: The difference in implementations by 
provinces and Measurements 
3.1 The difference in the implementation of economic institutions among 
provinces in Vietnam 
In reality, it is hard to identify what creates the difference in economic management 
among provinces. In Viet Nam, the political system and government structures are 
identical in all provinces and provincial governments do not have the power to promulgate 
laws; however, they are the bodies that directly implement laws and policies and the 
implementation of laws is different among provinces. In this paper, we explain for this 
difference by the following reasons: (i) Urban versus Rural, (ii) North versus South, and 
(iii) the complexity and ambiguity of the laws and regulations. 
(i) Urban versus Rural 
In Vietnam, big cities tend to attract the most highly educated human resources for 
all positions including officials of the provincial authorities. Apart from that, there are also 
many more dynamic and influential business associations in urban than in rural areas. 
Moreover, cities have advantages over rural areas of information technology; thus, 
enterprises in urban areas can update information about policy changes more quickly and 
accurately. 
(ii) North versus South 
The differences between the south and the north come from the historical factors. 
Accordingly, the culture of North Vietnam was previously described as a culture of wet 
rice cultivation with village settlements. A village was an autonomous region where people 
paid taxes and fulfilled obligations to the State. Due to the unclear demographic system 
and the communication difficulties, the village chiefs were motivated to retain a portion of 
the taxes and create their own rules, leading to high level of independence of local 
governments and the lack of transparency between local and central governments (Tran et 
al., 2008). 
South Vietnam is concentrated around the Mekong Delta. Difficulties in 
establishing a new life led the people here to be open and cooperative. This explains why 
South Vietnamese leaders understand the needs and aspirations of the private sector. As a 
result, Southern leaders often provide businesses with information on legal requirements, 
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business partners, and technology services to promote the development of private 
enterprises (Tran et al., 2008). 
In addition, recent political and historical factors also influence the differences in 
institutional practice between the southern and northern provinces. Before 1975, the South 
was under the domination of the United States, and Southern Vietnam followed the market 
economy. When the country reunited in 1975, the country adopted a centrally planned 
economy. Thus, the South only implemented the planned economy for 11 years (1975 -
1986), while the North implemented the planned economy for 32 years (1954 - 1986). 
Therefore, in the Northern provinces, land and agricultural centralization is more rigorous 
and comprehensive than in the Southern provinces. Also due to the difference, during "Doi 
Moi", it is easier for the Northern provinces to manage the market economy than the 
Northern provinces (Dinh Thi Thanh Binh, 2009). 
        (iii) The complexity and ambiguity of the laws and regulations 
         In Viet Nam, due to the complexity of the laws, a large number of subordinate 
documents such as decrees, decisions, and regulations are issued to guide the 
implementation of laws. Moreover, continuous legislative amendments of laws can create 
inconsistencies in implementation across provinces. Complexity and ambiguity in many 
laws and regulations at the central level make the implementation of the law highly 
dependent on interpretative documents by local officials. Even when the rules are clear, 
there is always some ways to explain policies in a way that is favorable for a particular 
group (Tenev et al., 2003). Some provinces explicitly stated that their objective was to 
attract foreign direct investment, thus, they grant many favors for enterprises of this type 
such as access to land, access to finance, high-quality labor, and tax incentives. Similarly,  
private firms often complain that provinces have biased attitudes toward the state sector. 
One example of state sector bias is the difference in collateral requirement between private 
and state-owned enterprises. In order to get a loan, a firm in the private sector is required to 
have sufficient collaterals to fully pay the loan in the worst case,  whereas no collateral is 
required to loan to the state sector.  Bankers in state-owned commercial banks tend to 
believe that lending to the state sector is a safer bet. 
3.2 Measurements of economic institutions in Vietnam 
Economic institutions in Vietnam are measured by the Provincial Competitiveness 
Index (PCI) on Vietnam's business environment, conducted annually by Vietnam Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) (Nguyen Van Thang et al, 2012, 2013; Tran Thi Bich 
et al, 2008; Neil et al, 2013; Doan Quang Hung et al, 2014; Pham The Anh and Nguyen 
Duc Hung, 2014). Although provincial governments do not have the power to promulgate 
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laws and policies, they are the bodies that directly implement them. The difference across 
provinces in the implementation allows analyzing economic institutions at the provincial 
level. 
PCI was introduced in 2005. At that time, VCCI only calculated PCI for 42 of the 
63 provinces and cities of Vietnam with 8 sub-indices. Since 2006, PCI has been calculated 
for 63 provinces and cities with 10 sub-indices. The 10 sub-indices include: (i) Entry costs 
for business start-up; (ii) Access to land security of business premises; (iii) Transparency 
and access to information; (iv) Time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and 
inspections; (v) Informal charges; (vi) State-Sector Bias; (vii) Proactiveness and 
creativeness of provincial leadership; (viii) Business support services; (ix) Labor training 
and (x) Legal procedures for dispute resolution (For detail, please see Appendix 2). More 
specifically, 
(i) Entry costs for business start-up: A measure of the time it takes firms to register, 
acquire land, and receive all the necessary licenses to start the business, the number 
of licenses required and the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all 
licenses/permits. 
(ii) Access to the land security of business premises: A measure combining two 
dimensions of the land problems confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access 
land and the security of tenure once the land is acquired. The first dimension 
comprises whether firms possess their official land use rights certificate, whether 
they have enough land for their business expansion requirements, whether they are 
renting from SOEs and an assessment of land conversion efforts. The second 
dimension includes perceptions of various tenure security risks (such as 
expropriation, unfair compensation values, or changes in the lease contract) as well 
as the duration of tenure. 
(iii) Transparency and access to information: A measure of whether firms have access 
to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their business, whether 
those documents are equitably available, whether new policies and laws are 
communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and the business utility of the 
provincial web page. 
(iv) Time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and inspections: A measure of how 
much time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance as well as how often and how 
long firms must shut their operations down for inspections by local regulatory 
agencies. 
(v) Informal charges: A measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how 
much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether 
payment of those extra fees results in expected results or 'services', and whether 
   10 
 
provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to extract rents. 
(vi) State-Sector Bias: A measure of the competition regime confronting private 
business focusing on the perceived bias of provincial governments toward state-
owned enterprises (SOES) and equitized firms in terms of incentives, policy, and 
access to capital. 
(vii) Proactiveness and creativeness of provincial leadership: A measure of the creativity 
and cleverness of provinces in both implementing central policy, designing their 
own initiatives for private sector development, and working within sometimes 
unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of local 
private firms. 
(viii) Business support services: A measure of provincial services for private sector trade 
promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner 
matchmaking, provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological 
services for firms. 
(ix) Labor training: A measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote 
vocational training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the 
placement of local labor. 
(x) Legal procedures for dispute resolution:  
(xi) the private sector in the provincial legal institutions, whether firms regard 
provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute resolution or as an 
avenue for lodging appeals against the corrupt official behavior.  
The PCI is constructed in a three-step sequence, referred to as “the 3 Cs”  
Step 1: Data Collection 
Two general types of data are used to construct the sub-indices. The first is 
perceptions data drawn from a mail-out survey of private firms. This perceptions or "soft" 
data was combined with objective or "hard" data gathered from statistical yearbooks, 
interviews with third-parties such as state-owned banks or real estate firms, or collected 
from business associations. 
 Step 2: Processing the Data to Construct the Subindices 
An important strength of the PCI is that it compares provincial economic 
governance against best practices already found in Vietnam, not against some idealized 
standard. For this reason, the indicator was standardized to a ten-point scale
3
, whereby the 
                                                          
3
 The following standardization formula was used if a high score on an indicator meant good governance: 
{9*((Provincial Score–Sample Minimum)/ (Sample Maximum - Sample Minimum)) + 1}. If a high score on 
an indicator meant poor performance, the above formula was subtracted from 11. 11-[9*((Provincial Score -
Sample Minimum)/(Sample Maximum-Sample Minimum))+1] 
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best and worst performing provinces would be awarded the scores of 10 and 1 respectively, 
and the other 61 provinces would be distributed somewhere along the scale between these 
two scores. 
Step 3: Construction of the Final PCI  
A simple summation of these sub-indices yields the un-weighted index with a 
maximum possibility of 100 points 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Theoretical models 
Cobb – Douglas production function, the theoretical model used to analyze the 
relationship takes the following form: 
  A ji i i j i jY A f X X

   (1) 
in which, Yi – output of enterprise i, Ai – technological capacity of enterprise i or 
productivity factor of enterprise i, Xi  - inputs for production of enterprise i  Suppose that 
enterprise i combines two inputs i.e. labor Li and capital Ki in production process, the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is now rewritten under linear function as follows: 
1 2
i i i iY A K L
      or   1 2ln ln ln lni i i i iY A K L v     ,            (2) 
in which β1 and β2 are the elasticity of output with respect to capital and labor 
respectively; iv  is the random error of the model assumed that having the average value of 
0 and fixed variance. Ai is described by the following equation 
lnAi = a0 + Σja1j Cji  + Σja2j Zji +Σjj PCIji + ei ,                                              (3) 
in which, PCIji is the vector of variables representing the effect of the provincial 
competitiveness index number j on the performance of enterprise number i. Cji is the vector 
of variables representing management mechanism and other features of enterprise (e.g 
ownership category, enterprise scope, operating field, operating years). Zji is the vector 
controlling effect of other factors such as economic locality (include 7 economic regions 
which are municipalities, Red river delta, Northern mountainous area, central coast, central 
highland, Southeast area, Mekong river delta); finally ei is the error measuring effect of 
random productivity shocks which have independent distribution and standardization with 
average value of 0 and fixed variance. Combine (2) and (3), we have the aggregate model 
as follows: 
lnYi = β0 + β1lnKi + β2lnLi + Σja1jCji + Σj a2j Zji+ΣjjPCIji+ εi                                             
(4) 
Equation (4) could be estimated using cross-section data. However, using this 
method causes limitations such as small sample size, biased estimation due to unobserved 
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variables, and lack of findings of the intertemporal effect. Using panel data to analyze can 
overcomes that limitation because panel data contain information on both the intertemporal 
dynamics and the individuality of the entities may allow one to control the effects of 
missing or unobserved variables. Equation (4) with panel data is transformed into the new 
form: 
             lnYit =  + lnKit + lnLit + ΣjjCijt + Σj jZijt  +∑jPCIijt ci +uit                        (5) 
This study also uses Composite PCI to replace the 9 sub-indices of PCI. Then, model (5) 
can be rewritten as: 
lnYit =  + lnKit + lnLit + ΣjjCijt + Σj jZijt +  Composite PCIit ci +uit                      
(6) 
In order to analyze the impact of economic institutions on the performances of 
different types of enterprise, the paper uses the interaction terms between Composite PCI 
and dummy variables for types of enterprise (FDI enterprise, the state-owned enterprise, 
and non-state enterprise, where enterprises belonging to the FDI group will be the base 
category). Then, model (5) is rewritten as follows: 
lnYit =  + lnKit + lnLit + ΣjjCijt + Σj jZijt +1Composite PCI + 2Composite 
PCI_State-owned enterprise3Composite PCI_Non-State enterprise ci +uit                                   (7) 
in which, Composite PCI_State-owned enterprise = Composite PCI * Dummy State-owned 
enterprise and Composite PCI_Non-State enterprise = Composite PCI * Dummy Non- 
State enterprise. ci captures the individual effect and is assumed to be fixed in the fixed 
effects model. For the random effects model, it is stochastic and distributed. In other 
words, the individual effect is not correlated with the error-term but with the repressors in 
the fixed effects model. Moreover, uit is the error-term. 
4.2 Data sources 
Data of enterprises are extracted from the Enterprises Survey (GES) done by the 
General Statistics Office for the time from 2006 to 2014. Meanwhile, data of the economic 
institution are from the PCI Data by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Vietnam 
for the time from 2006 – 2014. PCI includes many criteria which best represent the 
business environment or the market-supporting economic institutions. Although authorities 
at provincial level do not have the power to promulgate regulations and policies, they are 
are the ones who directly implement them. The difference among provinces in the 
implementation of laws and policies allows using provincial level as the unit to measure 
the quality of economic institutions (Nguyen Van Thang et al, 2012). The full data set used 
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for studying the impact of the economic institutions on the investment decisions and 
performances of enterprises is created by combining the above data sets. 
4.3 Variables and proxies 
Dependent variable: Enterprises' performance: There are many proxies that can be 
used to measure the performance of enterprises such as before-tax profit, after-tax profit, 
revenue and net revenue. This paper will use the total revenue from goods and services 
sold and total before-tax profit of enterprises as the proxy to measure their performances 
(Madsen, 1987 and Almasand Hans, 2008; Pham The Anh and Nguyen Duc Hung, 2014). 
Especially, the study makes the new contribution to the topic as it uses the added values 
from the business and production process (see Appendix 3) and the ratio between the value 
added and the average number of the labor of enterprises as the proxies to measure 
enterprises' performances. 
Independent variables: 
The two most important inputs, capital (Ki,t) and labor (Li,t)
4
, are measured by the 
average physical capital (average of the physical capital at the beginning of the year and 
the physical capital at the end of the year) and average number of labors (the average of the 
number of labors at the beginning of the year and the number of labors at the end of the 
year) which are used in the business operation of an enterprise (Pham The anh and Nguyen 
Duc Hung, 2014; Tran Thi Bich et al, 2008; Bernanke and Gilchrist, 1996; Budina et al, 
2000; Nguyen Thi Canh, 2004). This variable will be transformed into logarithms when 
put in the model. 
The variable reflecting the economic institution is measured by the Provincial 
Competitiveness Index of Vietnam (Nguyen Van Thang et al, 2012, 2013; Tran Thi Bich et 
al, 2008; Neil et al, 2013; Doan Quang Hung et al, 2014; Pham The Anh and Nguyen Duc 
Hung, 2014). PCI from 2006 to 2009 consists of 10 sub-indices. Then, from 2009 to 2012, 
in order to reflect the development of the economy and changes in the legal environment, 
the sub-index State- Sector Bias was dropped out and there were 9 sub-indices left. From 
2013 to 2014, PCI developed a new sub-index to reflex the equal competitive environment. 
Thus, this study only uses the nine most stable criteria in nine consecutive years including 
(i) entry costs for business start-up, (ii) access to land security of business premises, (iii) 
transparency and access to information, (iv) time requirements for bureaucratic procedures 
and inspections, (v) informal charges, (vi) proactiveness and creativeness of provincial 
leadership, (vii) business support services, (viii) Labor training and (ix) legal procedures 
                                                          
4
 The Enterprise Survey by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam only provides information on the number 
of full-time workers of enterprises. There is no information on the number of working hours for each 
enterprise in this survey. The data source does not distinguish between the types of workers 
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for dispute resolution. Besides, Composite PCI is also used. Finally, the model also uses an 
interaction term which is the product of Composite PCI and types of ownership to analyze 
the impact of economic institutions on the performances of enterprises with regards to 
types of ownership. 
As stated above, PCI evaluates the efficiency of economic governance and 
establishment of a favorable business environment of the local governments. There are 
differences in the governance of different provinces/ regions because of the difference in 
implement capability, regional culture, and geographic characteristics such as high-quality 
labors, better infrastructure in cities and easier access to land in countrysides, etc. Thus, 
which justifies the use of the PCI as the proxy for economic institutions at the regional 
level.  
 Independent variables reflecting the characteristics of an enterprise (Cijt) include 
types of ownership (FDI enterprise, the state-owned enterprise, and non-state enterprise), 
business scales (big-sized enterprises, medium-sized enterprises, and small and very small 
enterprises), business sectors and ages of the enterprises. Of which, the first characteristic 
is represented by 2 dummy variables, which take on the value of 1 if subject belongs to the 
research category and 0 otherwise; and enterprises belonging to the FDI group will be the 
base category. The second characteristic
5
 is represented by 3 dummy variables which take 
on the value of 1 if subject belongs to the research category and 0 otherwise, and 
enterprises having big sizes will be the base category. Enterprises are classified into sectors 
according to level 1 industry classification VSIC - 2007 including industry and 
manufacturing, agriculture – forestry – fishing, mining and quarrying, construction, retail, 
transportation and storage, accommodation and food services, information and 
communication, finance and banking, real estates, science and technology, electricity and 
gas supply, water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation, and others. 13 
dummy variables present business sectors; in which these dummy variables which take on 
the value of 1 if subject belongs to the research category and 0 otherwise, and other sectors 
will be the base category. Age of an enterprise is the difference between the survey year 
and the establishment year of the enterprise. Vector Zijt represents the geographic location. 
6 dummy variables will be used to represent 7 economic regions which are municipalities, 
Red river delta, Northern mountainous area, central coast, central highland, Southeast area, 
Mekong river delta. These dummy variables take on the value off 1 if the subject belongs 
to the research category and 0 otherwise, and municipalities belong to the base category.  
5. Estimation and discussion 
                                                          
5
 In Vietnam, Decision no. 56/2009/NĐ-CP of the Government defines different enterprise sizes as follows: 
Enterprises with less than 10 workers is classified as very-small enterprises, the enterprise with 10-200 workers are 
classified as small-sized enterprises, enterprises with 200-300 workers are classified as medium-sized enterprises, and 
enterprises with more than 300 workers are classified as large-sized ones. 
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5.1 Statistical descriptions and correlation between variables 
The statistical descriptions of variables can be seen in Table 5.1.  
Descriptive statistics show that the market entry costs indicator was ranked the 
highest with an average score of 7.61, followed by an indicator of informal costs with an 
average score of 6.20. The lowest rating was on the proactiveness and creativeness of local 
leaders with 4.67 points. Before-tax earnings can take on the negative value, thus, we can 
not take the logarithm of this variable. On the other hand, the paper only studies those 
businesses with positive revenue.  





deviation Minimum Maximum 
Revenue 1001753 34486.76 821770.10 0.1 512000000 
Before-tax earnings 1011473 1262.96 141753.20 -39100000 61000000 
Added values 4377672 6.52 1.48 0,14 58900000 
Average number of labors 1013890 40.97 328.39 1 86974 
Average amount of capital 1013890 41406.29 1330688.00 0.35 540000000 
Enterprise age 1013890 4.93 4.96 1 77 
Entry costs 1013890 7.61 1.04 5.07 9.6 
Access to land 1013890 5.77 1.22 3.04 8.84 
Transparency 1013890 5.98 0.58 2.76 8,.85 
Time costs 1013890 5.91 0.84 2.85 8.93 
Informal costs 1013890 6.20 0.83 4.33 8.94 
Proactiveness and 
creativeness 1013890 4.67 1.35 1.39 9.39 
Labor training 1013890 5.71 0.72 1.84 8.4 
Legal procedures 1013890 4.62 1.06 2 7.34 
Supporting services  1013890 5.88 1.51 1.4 8.75 
Composite PCI 1013890 58.79 4.17 36.39 75.96 
State-owned enterprise 1013890 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Non-State enterprise  1013890 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Super small enterprise 1013890 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Small-sized enterprise 1013890 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Medium-sized enterprise 1013890 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery 
1013890 
0.02 0.12 0 1 
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Industry 1013890 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Electricity production and 
distribution 
1013890 
0.00 0.07 0 1 
Water Supplies 1013890 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Construction 1013890 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Retail 1013890 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Transportation  1013890 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 





deviation Minimum Maximum 
Service  1013890 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Information  1013890 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Finance 1013890 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Real Estate 1013890 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Science 1013890 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Red River Delta 1013890 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Northern Mountainous Area 1013890 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Central Coast 1013890 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Central Highland 1013890 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Southeast area  1013890 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Mekong River Delta 1013890 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI PCI 
data for the 2006 – 2014 period. 
On the other hand, the structure of the sample by type shows that 96% are private 
enterprises, 3% are FDI enterprises and 1% are state-owned enterprises. As for the size of 
enterprises, 3% are large enterprises, 60% are super small enterprises, 36% are small 
enterprises and 1% are medium enterprises. By sector, retail sales account for 38% of the 
sample, followed by processing and manufacturing 18% and construction, at 15%. In the 
economic region, the most concentrated area is the Central City (37%), followed by the 
Mekong River Delta (25%), and least in the Central Highlands (2%). 
The correlation matrix between variables is shown in Table 5.2 below. According 
to this matrix, two important inputs are labor and capital, which are strongly positively 
correlated with the performance of enterprises (the correlation coefficient is greater than 
50%). This correlation is perfectly consistent with economic theory. In addition, most 
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indicators of economic institutions have the positive but low correlation with the 
performance of enterprises. In particular, the correlation between business performance 
and institutional factors ranges from 1% to 3%. On the other hand, the composite PCI has a 
low correlation with performance (about 2%). Finally, the level of correlation between the 
explanatory variables is lower than 70%, so there is no high multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables. 
 
5.2 Estimation and discussion 
In this study, the model can be estimated using panel data regression method, 
including Pooled OLS model (POLS), random effect model (RE) and fixed effect model 
(FE)
6
. In order to choose the most effective model, refer to appendix tables that show the 
results of the tests. Include Lagrange Multiplier test (xttest0) to choose between POLS and 
RE model, where the null hypothesis is that the disturbances' variance is constant across 
entities or POLS model are more suitable, and Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to choose 
between RE model and FE model, where the null hypothesis underlying the Hausman test 
is that the difference in the coefficient estimates of the consistent FE and the RE models 
are not systematic, and thus individual-level effects can be adequately modeled by an RE 
model. 
The result of the test for choosing between POLS and RE indicates that RE 
model is more efficient (see Appendix 4). On the other hand, the data used in this study 
is an unbalanced panel dataset, with small T (9 years) and large N (625293 enterprises). 
Therefore, the model used for analysis in the study is the robust random-effects model 
(RE) (Baltagi, 2008). Also, Hausman test indicates that RE model is more efficient (see 
Appendix 5 and Appendix 6). The estimations of the impacts of economic institutions 
on the performances of enterprises are shown in Table 5.3. 
The result from Table 5.3 shows that two important inputs, labor, and capital, have 
positive effects on firms' performances (revenue, before tax earnings, and added values). 
This finding is perfectly consistent with economic theories.   
On the other hand, the more experienced the business is, the higher its revenue is, 
but the marginal returns decrease. Also, the regression coefficients on the types of 
                                                          
6
 Potentially reverse causality between economic institutions and a firm’s performance could be an issue. To 
check, we can use the causality test for panel data. One condition of the test is that each entity must be 
investigated in at least 5 periods (Baltagi, 2008). This study uses panel data with T=9 years, however, each 
enterprise was investigated in no more than 5 periods, so the test cannot be done. However, the performance 
of an individual firm is unlikely to have an impact on the institutions in the whole region since it can be 
assumed that the influence of each individual firm is too small to affect aggregate outcomes. 
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enterprise (state-owned and private enterprises) are statistically significant at 1%. This 
implies, in the same economic institution environment, there is a difference in average 
performances of state-owned and private enterprises in comparison with that of FDI 
enterprises. Specifically, FDI enterprises have better performances (revenue and added 
values)  than other enterprises. However, before-tax earnings of FDI enterprises are smaller 
than those of other firms. 
Basically, FDI enterprises have strong financial resources, professional methods 
of doing business, and better access to credit and land resources domestic ones (VCCI, 
2015). As a result, revenues and added values of FDI enterprises are likely to be larger 
than state-owned and private enterprises. As for pre-tax earnings and added value ratio, 
as most private enterprises are small and medium-sized ones, they face many 
difficulties in doing business such as lack of capital, difficulty in accessing financial 
sources, limited product demand, severe competitions, etc (Central Institute for 
Economic Management-CIEM, 2016); Thus, the performances of private enterprises 
are very limited. Meanwhile, most state-owned enterprises are large enterprises and are 
supported by the state through financial relations. At the same time, the FDI enterprises 
often take advantage of transfer pricing by purchasing the input materials of the parent 
companies at high prices and selling products to the parent companies at low prices. 
This results in the loss in subsidiaries and larger profits in parent companies. Thus, 
before-tax earnings of FDI enterprises is smaller than that of state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, the majority of control variables for business sector are statistically 
significant at 10%, which means that in the same economic institutional environment 
there are differences in performance of enterprises across sectors. Specifically, 
industries with the high concentration of businesses such as industry, construction, and 
retail have higher revenues than other industries but their earnings, added values, and 
added value ratio are smaller than those of other sectors. In addition, there are 
differences in revenues, added values but no differences in pre-tax earnings among 
enterprises in different regions. In particular, although the central city area has the 
largest number of businesses (37%), the average revenue of enterprises in this area is 
smaller than those in the Red River Delta, The Central Highlands, Southeast area but 
greater than the rest. In contrast, the average added value of firms in the central city is 
greater than those of firms in other regions but smaller than those of firms in the 
Mekong Delta area. Also, the added value ratio of firms in the Centre city area is larger 
than those of other regions. 
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For the group of the control variable for enterprise size, super small, small and 
medium-sized enterprises have higher average revenues and added values than large-sized 
firms, but their pre-tax earnings are smaller. 
In particular, most economic institution variables are significant at 10%. This 
implies that most of the changes in economic institutions affect enterprise performance. 
Some indicators have positive effects while some have negative effects. Specifically, 
i) Indicator on market entry costs has a positive impact on revenue, before-tax 
earning and added value. This result is consistent with economic theory. In contrast, 
market entry costs indicator has the negative effect on the value-added ratio. By 2015, the 
cost of entering the market has been reduced maximally (PCI Report, 2015). Therefore, the 
cost to enter the market fell sharply, and firms quickly enter the market and conduct 
productions; 
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Table 5.2. Pair-wise correlation matrix between variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Revenue 1.00                               
2. Before-tax earnings 0.47 1.00                             
3. Added values 0.63 0.80 1.00                           
4. Average labor force 0.26 0.13 0.53 1.00                         
5. Average capital 0.57 0.62 0.74 0.28 1.00                       
6. Enterprise age 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.16 1.00                     
7. Entry costs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 1.00                   
8. Access to land -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.32 1.00                 
9. Transparency  0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.66 1.00               
10. Time costs -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.34 0.66 -0.33 1.00             
11. Informal costs -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.28 0.30 0.14 0.34 1.00           
12. Proactiveness and 
creativeness -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.29 0.52 -0.25 0.24 0.24 1.00         
13. Labor training 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.12 -0.43 0.27 -0.61 -0.24 -0.17 1.00       
14. Legal procedures -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.79 -0.19 -0.14 -0.23 -0.08 0.57 0.23 1.00     
15. Supporting services 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.38 -0.88 0.33 -0.73 -0.48 -0.43 0.64 0.35 1.00   
16. Composite PCI 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.33 -0.39 0.40 -0.37 0.03 -0.31 0.73 -0.11 0.52 1.00 
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Table 5.3. Estimation results: Impacts of economic institutions on revenues, before-tax earnings, added values and ratio of added 
values over average capital force 
Variables Ln(Revenue) Before-tax earnings  Ln(Added values) 
Ratio of added values over 
average capital force 
LnL 0.808*** 0.808*** 1454.042*** 1444.402*** 0.651*** 0.647*** -238.45*** -223.065*** 
LnK 0.300*** 0.290*** 1186.165*** 1150.197*** 0.455*** 0.46*** 233.698*** 215.553*** 
Enterprise Age 0.108*** 0.111*** 161.115*** 177.324*** 0.02*** 0.019*** -2.178 -4.660 
(Enterprise Age)
2
 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.427 0.138 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.210 0.272 
State-owned Enterprise -0.420*** -0.406*** 14939.556* 15009.838* -0.163*** -0.153*** -103.211 -88.988 
Private enterprise -0.650*** -0.653*** -6590.205*** -6599.181*** -0.7*** -0.684*** -301.587*** -338.080** 
Super small enterprise 0.307*** 0.285*** -17775.308*** 
-
17895.274*** 0.113*** 0.121*** -70.580 -101.592 
Small-sized enterprise 0.369*** 0.356*** -20300.195*** 
-
20350.069*** 0.076*** 0.082*** -33.430 -45.801 
Medium-sized 
enterprise 0.205*** 0.200*** -14525.648*** 
-
14555.159*** 0.17*** 0.168*** 34.089 30.924 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishery -0.392*** -0.335*** -9787.45*** -9636.64*** -0.274*** -0.31*** 2518.214* 2505.804* 
Mining 0.096*** 0.129*** 3742.522 3811.998 0.16*** 0.129*** -186.55*** -183.499*** 
Industry 0.391*** 0.409*** -1517.385*** -1485.912*** 0.026*** 0.022*** -169.419*** -158.477*** 
Construction 0.139*** 0.161*** -1692.179*** -1639.013*** -0.324*** -0.334*** -326.202*** -313.249*** 
Retail 1.107*** 1.125*** -423.227* -388.330* -0.093*** -0.101*** -295.943*** -277.814*** 
Transportation 0.715*** 0.731*** -1028.349*** -974.459*** 0.262*** 0.259*** -145.296*** -127.493*** 
Service 0.041*** 0.057*** -82.902 -16.663 -0.511*** -0.514*** -84.497** -55.679 
Information 0.251*** 0.238*** 2557.659** 2561.525** -0.077*** -0.078*** -18.901 -5.436 
Finance -0.321*** -0.281*** 12078.129*** 12215.492*** -0.278*** -0.302*** 1887.587 1922.785 
Real Estate -0.568*** -0.548*** -514.181 -445.295 -0.098*** -0.107*** -254.522** -206.626* 
Science -0.067*** -0.065*** 109.834 119.790 0.071*** 0.069*** -138.329*** -136.305*** 
Electricity production 
and distribution 0.133*** 0.194*** 2933.925* 3081.250* 0.241*** 0.196*** -50.837*** -28.556*** 
Water Supplies 0.014 0.036 -6155.320*** -6133.689*** 0.019 0.006 -80.867** -74.173** 
Red River Delta 0.019*** 0.082*** -202.005 200.354 -0.039*** -0.099*** -161.182*** -23.861 
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Table 5.3. Estimation results: Impacts of economic institutions on revenues, before-tax earnings, added values and ratio of 
added values over average capital force (cont.) 
Variables Ln(Revenue) Before-tax earnings  Ln(Added values) 
Ratio of added values over 
average capital force 
Northern mountainous 
area -0.020*** 0.080*** -275.910 96.200 -0.015* -0.142*** -205.964*** -35.310 
Central Coast -0.022*** 0.065*** -272.189 12.415 -0.061*** -0.138*** -82.464* -75.579*** 
Central Highlands 0.070*** 0.169*** -570.098 -166.073 -0.081*** -0.176*** -216.282** -22.597 
Southeast area 0.019*** 0.129*** 306.914 514.762 0.056*** -0.004 98.144 80.865 
Mekong River Delta -0.041*** -0.029*** -255.266 -69.117 0.101*** 0.146*** -197.299*** -110.652*** 
Entry costs 0.010***   249.520**   0.016***                49.266                
Access to land 0.049***   389.734*   -0.005**                58.723**                
Transparency -0.051***   225.898*   0.054***                244.859***                
Time costs 0.020***   31.789*   0.008***                -16.441                
Informal costs 0.022***   61.065*   0.062***                -115.038***                
Proactiveness and 
creativeness -0.002   -218.319   -0.046***                -26.763                
Labor training -0.034***   -325.357***   0.049***                -189.452**                
Legal procedures 0.012***   279.234*   0.017***                49.767                
Supporting services -0.003*   281.696**   0.009***                68.483**                
Composite PCI   0.002***   63.593***   0.007***   12.999*** 
Intercept 2.336*** 2.398*** 6161.147* 8691.996** 0.946*** 2.277*** -1403.068*** -1284.178*** 
Number of observation 1001753 1001753 1011473 1011473 437672 437672 437672 437672 
Coefficient of 
determination 0.4982 0.4949 0.32 0.32 0.7399 0.7384 0.17 0.17 
Note: *,**,*** means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance respectively. 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI PCI data for the 2006 – 2014 period.
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ii) Indicator on land access has positive impacts on revenues, before tax earnings, 
added value ratio of enterprises. This result is consistent with economic theory. In contrast, 
it has the opposite effects to added value. Easy access to land and stable land use are 
critical to the survival and development of an enterprise's business operations. The 
publicity of information on the planning of sectors, especially the land use planning at 
different levels and land prices on electronic information portals are also effective, helping 
investors easily find out. Therefore, this indicator positively impacts firms' performances. 
However, the problem of stable land use is still limited. For example, many enterprises 
have land but do not have the certificates of land use rights, which creates hesitations in 
doing businesses. Also, there are differences in land access and stable use of land among 
types of enterprises, and among enterprises of different sizes. Therefore, in some cases 
access to land and stable use of land negatively impacts the successes of enterprises; 
iii) Indicator on transparency has positive impacts on the before-tax earnings, added 
value, the added value ratio of enterprises. This result is consistent with economic theory. 
In contrast, this indicator has the opposite effect on revenues of firms. Information 
transparency is one of the most important criteria in the 10 criteria for assessing the 
provincial competitiveness index because it is the key to the successes of businesses. 
Transparency also reduces the cost of searching for information and informal cost and 
creates equal business opportunities for firms, etc. Therefore, enterprises will have the 
confidence to make investments and improve their performances; 
iv) Indicator on time costs has a positive impact on enterprises’ performances. This 
result is consistent with economic theory. Improvements in this area, or said, in other 
words, improvement of administrative procedures (regulations, qualifications, and attitudes 
of operational staff), and time for inspection will help enterprises improve their 
performances; 
v) Indicator on informal costs has positive impacts on revenues, before tax 
earnings, added values of enterprises. This result is consistent with economic theory. In 
contrast, it has the opposite effect on the added value ratio. This is one of the areas that 
face big concerns of businesses when operating in the market. This cost makes the capital 
cost and production cost of enterprises increased. More importantly, informal costs cause 
transparency which results in the distrust of both domestic and foreign enterprises and 
investors. Reduction of this cost will have a positive impact on the performances of firms; 
vi) Indicator on the proactiveness and creativeness of provincial leadership does not 
affect the revenues, before tax earnings, added value ratio of enterprises but negatively 
affects the added values of enterprises. In the implementation of policies from the central 
level, local leaders have shown their dynamism and creativity in leadership. However, the 
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local authorities have not done inspection and review of the implementation of the 
directions from upper levels enough. Therefore, local staffs who directly work with 
enterprises are still harassed, causing obstacles to firms, and thus bad effects on firms' 
profits; 
vii) Indicator on labor training has negative effects on the majority of the 
enterprise's performance measurements. This result is not consistent with economic theory. 
On the contrary, it positively impacts added values of enterprises. The quality of labor 
training is considered one of the leading factors determining the ability to attract 
investment, affecting the future development of the economy and enterprises. However, 
due to the large differences between the skills of workers and the needs of enterprises or 
the difference in the demand for labor between industries, most of the enterprises have to 
train more or re-train employees, which make training costs increase. As a result, the 
improvement of this index does not bring positive effects for most measurements of 
enterprises' performances; 
viii) Regarding the legal procedures, it has positive impacts on revenues, before tax 
earnings, and added values of enterprises. This result is consistent with economic theory. 
And it does not affect the added value ratio of the business. According to the theory of 
economic institutions, the guarantee of enterprises' ownership and reduction of transaction 
costs will create incentives for enterprises to decide to invest in development. Thus, it also 
improves their performances; 
ix) For business support services, it has positive impacts on before-tax earnings, 
added values and the added value ratio of enterprises but has the negative impact on 
revenues of enterprises. This may be because of the fact that these services are a preference 
of form over substance and enterprises, in order get support, may have to pay more time 
costs and financial costs.  
Finally, the general PCI (composite PCI) index is used to replace the nine 
indicators. The results show that most regression coefficients are positive and significant at 
1%, which means that economic institutions have a positive impact on enterprises’ 
performances. 
Next, the study will analyze the impact of economic institutions on enterprises' 
performances by type of enterprise. Specifically, the study using interactive variables 
which are the products of the composite PCI index with the enterprise types. The results of 
the estimation of the effects of economic institutions on the performances of different types 
of enterprises are shown in Table 5.4. According to the result, the majority of the 
regression coefficients on the interaction variables are statistically significant at 10%. This 
implies that as the quality of economic institutions improves, its effect on different types of 
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the enterprise will be different. In particular, improving the quality of economic institutions 
will help revenues and the added values of state-owned enterprises increase more strongly 
than FDI enterprises. Similarly, revenue of Non-State enterprises increases more strongly 
than that of FDI enterprises but their added value and added value ratio decrease more 
strongly. On the other hand, there is no difference in the effect of PCI across firm types in 
pre-tax earnings among types of enterprises. 
Table 5. 4. Estimation of the impacts of economic institutions on the performances of 
different types of enterprise 
 Variables Ln(Revenue) 
Before-tax 
Earnings Ln(Added Value) 
Added Value 
Ratio 
LnL 0.808*** 1441.279*** 0.647*** -222.913*** 
LnK 0.29*** 1147.13*** 0.461*** 215.641*** 
Enterprise Age 0.111*** 177.372*** 0.019*** -4.577 
(Enterprise Age) 
2
 -0.002*** 0.135 0.001*** 0.272 
State-owned enterprise -2.207*** -25158.873 -1.67** 833.048 
Private enterprise -1.229*** -2776.678 3.023*** 2423.512** 
Composite PCI 0.008*** 111.068* 0.054*** 57.752*** 
Composite PCI_State-
owned enterprise 0.031*** 704.175 0.025*** -15.437 
Composite PCI_Non -
State enterprise 0.010*** -64.249 -0.061*** -45.723*** 
Intercept 2.973*** 5873.149 -1.401*** -3989.362*** 
Number of observations 1001753 1011473 437672 437672 
Coefficient of 
determination 0.495 0.32 0.7387 0.17 
Control variables for 
enterprise size 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables for 
business sector 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables for 
operation region 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *,**,*** means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% 
level of significance respectively. 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI 
PCI data for the 2006 – 2014 period. 
In Vietnam, state-owned enterprises receive much support and privilege that other 
enterprises do not have. State-owned enterprise can borrow with no collateral. Even when 
their businesses are unprofitable, their debts will be frozen, reduced or deferred. State-
owned enterprises can also use land without paying land tax. Moreover, they are assigned 
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to perform State’s big projects that definitely generate huge profits. Enterprises in the State 
sector are treated as they were “red princes”. Similarly, FDI enterprises are always 
welcomed with "red carpet" with a series of land and tax incentives. On the contrary, 
enterprises in the non-state sector incur many difficulties such as little access to capital, 
land, and information, small size with outdated machines and equipment; as a result, their 
ability to compete is low. It is not so hard to understand why, in Vietnam, enterprises in the 
non-state sector are called the "red infants" (CIEM, 2016). Thus, improving the quality of 
economic institutions will help the performance of state-owned enterprises increase more 
strongly than that of FDI enterprises and performance of FDI enterprises increase more 
strongly than that of Non-State enterprises. 
6. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions 
Theoretical and empirical studies around the world have confirmed that economic 
institutions play an important role in the prosperity of an economy in general and in 
investment decision and business performance of an enterprise in particular. Recognizing 
the important role of economic institutions, Vietnam has been implementing many 
economic institutional reforms, namely reforms in the economic laws in the direction of 
forming a legal system that is consistent with a market economy. These reform efforts have 
initially achieved a number of achievements, especially the improvement of the business 
environment that encourages enterprises to invest and improve business performances. 
Based on the findings of this study, the paper makes some recommendations to 
improve the quality of economic institutions by improving the indicators of economic 
institutions, creating a good business environment and improving the successes of firms. 
According to empirical research, economic institutional indicators have an important 
influence on the performances of enterprises. The improvement of some economic 
institutional indicators has positive impacts; however, some negatively affect enterprises' 
performances. For indicators that have a positive impact, local authorities should continue 
to maintain and improve to enhance the quality of these indicators. For indicators that have 
the opposite effect, local authorities should pay attention to the reflection of representatives 
of business associations, seriously accept feedback, and review the entire process to ensure 
good implementation of the directions from upper levels. Specifically: 
First, as for land access and land use stability, in order to maintain and improve the 
quality of this index, local authorities should continuously ensure the accessibility of land 
and minimize the risks associated with the use of land. Particular attention should be paid 
to the equality of access to land and the stable use of land among different types of 
enterprise and enterprise sizes. On the other hand, further improvement of the land use 
planning system should be continued to improve the efficiency of this special and scarce 
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resource. Last but not least, improvement of the legal framework for resolving land 
disputes within the specific limits of ownership provided for by the Constitution and laws 
is also very important. This will definitely help enterprises to own and use land stably and 
effectively. As for enterprises, it is necessary to increase the understanding of the legal 
system related to access and use of land and take initiative in accessing information on 
land.  
Secondly, as for market entry, in order to improve this indicator, local authorities 
should review and recommend to the higher levels the amendment of the Enterprise Law 
and the Investment Law and guiding documents in the following directions: i) The 
regulations on market access are guaranteed, the right to do business of people and 
investors are not restricted indirectly (for example, the requirement to register business 
codes under the National Code System should be removed); ii) Procedures for business 
registration and investment should continue to be shortened and simplified maximally (for 
example reduction of number of days, reduction of procedures through integration of 
procedures and coordination between the authorities, and the duplication of business 
registration and investment registration should be eliminated); iii) lists businesses with 
conditions must be finalized and controlled to ensure that this category is unique (all 
industries not included in this category are subject to absolute business freedom of the 
investors); iv) Strengthen dissemination of information on provinces' efforts in 
implementing administrative reforms, particularly the procedures for establishment of 
enterprises, tax registration and seal making. These procedures have been considerably 
shortened compared with the feeling of enterprises; v) To continue to improve the one-
stop-shop mechanism in business establishment, tax registration, seal engraving and 
minimize the rate of late dossier returns; vi) To review all kinds of permits after the 
registration of enterprise establishment in the direction of simplifying the procedures and 
reducing the time in the spirit of the Investment Law and the amended Enterprise Law 
(effective July 1, 2015); to publicize the procedures and send it to a focal point for the 
guidance, reception and handling. 
Thirdly, in the field of transparency and access to information, it is necessary to 
review, supplement, amend and promulgate relevant laws with the participation and 
counteraction of enterprises. Each business should also be proactive in accessing 
information timely. One issue of concern now is that the classification of documents as 
"confidential" tends to be abused in some administrative agencies at the district, 
departmental, and sectorial levels with no consistent regulations. Any documents that the 
sector or the local authorities do not want to expose will automatically classify as 
"confidential". This tag becomes the barrier preventing enterprises and people access to 
information. Therefore, it is necessary to review all relevant documents of the State 
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regulating the confidentiality and restriction of confidentiality of non-confidential 
information in order to create a transparent mechanism for enterprises' access to 
information and constrain the negative things such as "If you want to have information, 
you have to pay" (VCCI, 2015). 
Fourthly, in the field of time costs to implement the regulations of the State, local 
authorities need to continue improving the administrative procedures and processes in a 
neat and light manner, minimizing the time to carry out administrative procedures so that 
firms can quickly start to do their businesses. In order to do so, it is necessary to i) 
Establish close coordination among sectors and levels in the province in dealing with 
administrative procedures related to taxation, business registration, land, and environment 
with the use of one-stop-shop mechanism; ii) Improve the quality of reviewing and 
evaluating administrative procedures of the province according to regulations; iii) Invest in 
working facilities and equipment which should be suitable for the bodies that receive and 
return dossiers, especially for commune-level units; iv) Strengthen coordination among 
sectors and levels in the process of elaborating, promulgating and implementing 
mechanisms, policies, regulations, and plans fully and promptly; v) To promptly commend 
and reward those officials and employees who well fulfill their assigned tasks; to handle 
those who are irresponsible and violating disciplines. In addition, there should be 
consistency and coordination between ministries, departments, and sectors in the 
inspection of enterprises to avoid overlapping inspections. 
Fifthly, as for informal costs, this is one of the problems that raise big concerns of 
enterprises when operating in the market. To reduce unofficial costs, the tasks that need to 
be done are: i) To shorten time to deal with administrative procedures; ii) To reinforce 
administrative disciplines, improve the quality of the one-stop-shop agencies and control 
the administrative procedures of state agencies; iii) Commit to solving problems and 
suggestions for enterprises. When enterprises face difficulties or problems, they will meet 
directly with those who are in charge of the problems. This further raises concerns about 
the increase of unofficial costs. Hence, the specific mechanism of grasping difficulties and 
devotion in solving problems will contribute to the reduction of unofficial costs; iv) Raise 
the capacity to reflect, defend and protect the interests of enterprises and well organize 
business support activities. 
Sixthly, the pro-activeness and creativeness of provincial leadership also need to be 
considered. The annual PCI report gives the impression of the dynamism of the authorities 
at all levels with the following statements: "When the central regulation is unclear, the 
provincial People Committee is very active and creative in solving new problems "; or 
"There are good initiatives at provincial level, but the implementation of departments is 
problematic." So far, although there have been a lot of reform initiatives, the effectiveness 
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of implementing them at lower levels, in particular departments and agencies, does not 
reflect the spirit of these initiatives. Therefore, in order to promote the positive influence of 
creative ideas from local leaders to enterprises, local authorities should pay attention to the 
feedbacks from representatives of business associations by seriously considering the 
feedbacks and reviewing the whole process to ensure proper implementation of directions 
from the higher level. It is essential to set up a hotline and publicize email addresses of 
leaders at all levels on the provincial web portal. 
Seventhly, as for business support services, local authorities need to further 
strengthen trade promotion, improve the export efficiency of enterprises. At the same time, 
trade fairs need to be organized to promote and support businesses to consumer products. 
Local governments should also support enterprises in the province to participate in trade 
fairs in and outside the country to expand investment cooperation and search for new 
markets. Another task is to provide information and forecast on goods' supplies, demands, 
and market prices to help firms develop proper production plans. Particularly, small and 
medium-sized enterprises now face many difficulties in accessing land, which makes it 
difficult for them to access credit capital due to lack of collaterals. Thus, credit institutions 
also need to study and expand additional forms of mortgage lending for this type of 
enterprises. On the other hand, enterprises should actively seek out support services 
suitable to their needs and objectives and actively contribute ideas to improve business 
support services. 
Eighthly, as for labor training, the quality of labor training is considered as one of 
the leading factors determining the ability to attract investments and affecting the future 
development of the economy. However, empirical research has not reflected this potential. 
Therefore, localities still need to make more efforts to improve the quality of labor 
resources for enterprises. Moreover, job exchange markets should be well organized to 
bridge the gap between enterprises and workers. In addition, enterprises also need to 
actively order local training centers to train a workforce in accordance with the 
requirements of their businesses. 
Ninthly, as for legal institutions, the results show that the local legal environment 
has improved positively. In order to maintain and promote the achievement, local 
authorities need to ensure a more secure legal environment to protect enterprises’ legal 
rights and at the same time strengthen the trust of enterprises to the local judicial system. 
In addition, measures should be taken to improve the capacity of institutions resolving civil 
and economic disputes. When disputes arise, enterprises should absolutely comply with 
laws using the court system. 
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Finally, according to the empirical analysis, institutional reform will bring the 
greatest benefits to the SOE sector, followed by those to the FDI sector and the non-state 
sector will receive the least advantage. Meanwhile, the non-state sector accounted for a 
large share of the economy (about 96%). As a result, the institutional reform process needs 
to focus on supporting and facilitating the non-state sector. 
In the final analysis, in order to improve the quality of economic institutions, the 
improvement of the economic institutional indicators must be implemented synthetically in 
three aspects namely "rules of play", "players" and "enforcement mechanisms". In 
Vietnam, "enforcement mechanisms" needs special attention. 
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Appendix 1. GSO Enterprises and Co-operatives Survey 
1. Name of the enterprise: 
(By capital letters, not in brief) 
Transaction name (if any): 
The tax code of the enterprise (ten-digit number): 








3. Operation Status: 
1 Active 
2 Stop for investment, technological innovation; stop due to seasonal factor 
3 Suspended waiting for dissolution 
4 Other (Please specify)…………………………………….. 
4. Is the enterprise located in an industrial zone, a manufacturing zone, an economic 
zone, or a high-tech zone? 
1. Yes, 1.1. Industrial zone   1.2. Manufacturing zone  
  1.3. Economic zone   1.4. High-tech zone 
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2. No 
5. Type of enterprise 
01 Central State Ltd. Co 
02 Local State Ltd. Co 
03 Joint-stock Co. having state capital > 50% 
04 State-owned Enterprise 
 4.1. Central State  4.2. Local State 
05 Collective/Co-operative 
 5.1. Co-operative  5.2. Collective 5.3. People’s Credit Fund 
06 Private enterprise 
07 Collective name 
08 Private Ltd. Co 
09 Joint-stock Co. not having state capital 
10 Joint-stock Co. having state capital ≤ 50% 
11 100% foreign capital 
12 Joint venture between State & foreign 
13 Joint venture between others & foreign 
6. Does the enterprise have im-export in the year? 
1. Yes 
 1.1 Direct export:                  Direct import:  
 1.2 Indirect export:                       Indirect import: 
2. No 
7. Does the enterprise have revenues and expenses from/for foreign services in 20_? 
(The total amount of receivables/payables for foreign services and transaction-related 
expenses not including the value of goods)  
1. Yes,  1.1. Revenue:             1.2. Expense: 
2. No 
8. Economic activities in the year 
8.1. Main business activity: 
Specify activity that creates most production value. If the production value cannot be 
determined, specify activity that generates the largest revenue for the enterprise (or use the 
largest amount of labor) 
8.2 Other activities: 
 - Activity:……………………………….. 
 - Activity:……………………………….. 
 - Activity:……………………………….. 
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 - Activity:……………………………….. 
9. Labor in 20_: 
9.1. Total labor at 01/01/20_:  laborers 
Of which: Female   laborers 
9.2. Total labor at 31/12/20_:       laborers 
Of which: Female  laborers 











At the end of 
year 
10.1. Total assets (01=02+08) 01   
A. Short-term assets 02   
Of which:    
 - Short term receivable  03   
 - Inventories: 04   
Of inventories:     
+ Works in Progress  05   
+ Finished products 06   
+ Consigned goods for sale 07   
B. Long-term assets 08   
In which:     
I. Long-term receivables 09   
II. Fixed assets    
 - Original value of fixed assets 10   
 - Accumulated depreciation 11   
 - Costs of unfinished construction works 12   
Fixed assets by type    
1. Buildings    
 - Original value  13    
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 - Accumulated depreciation 14    
 - In-year Depreciation 15   
2. Machines and equipment    
 - Original value  16    
 - Accumulated depreciation 17    
 - In-year Depreciation 18   
3. Means of transportation and transmission     
 - Original value  19    
 - Accumulated depreciation 20    
 - In-year Depreciation 21   
4. Other fixed assets    
 - Original value  22    
 - Accumulated depreciation 23    
 - In-year Depreciation 24   
10.2.Total capital sources (25=26+27) 25   
A. Liabilities 26   
B. Equity 27   
11. Business results in 20_ 
Unit: million dongs  
 Code Year 20_ 
11.1. Turnover of goods, services activities 01  
Of which: Production and business subsidies  02  
11.2. Reductions 03  
Of which:   
Tax (excise tax, export duties or fees, VAT paid directly) 04  
11.3. Net turnover of goods and services (05=01 - 03) 05  
Of which:   
 - Net retail revenue (for manufacturing enterprises) 06  
 - Net revenue from industrial services 07   
* Net turnover by economic activities:   
(Report VSIC 2007 - degree 5)   
Main activity:   
Other activities:   
Activity   
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Activity   
Activity   
11.4. Costs of goods sold 08  
11.5. Gross profit from sales and services (09=05 - 08) 09  
11.6. Turnover from financial activities 10  
11.7. Financial costs 11  
Of which: Domestic interest paid 12  
Foreign interest paid 13  
11.8. Profit from financial activities (14=10 - 11)  14   
11.9. Business management cost (net cost plus additional 
items on credit side of Account 642) 
15 
 
11.10. Sales cost (net cost plus additional items on credit side 
of Account 641) 
16 
 
Of which: Transportation costs outsource 17  
11.11. Net profit from business activity (18=09+14 - 15 - 16) 18  
11. 12. Other income 19   
11.13. Another cost 20   
11.14. Other profit (21=19 - 20)  21  
11.15. Total pre-tax accounting profit (22=18+21) 22   
11.16. Income tax cost (including both current and 
suspended enterprise income tax)  
23 
 
Of which: Current enterprise income tax 24  
11.17. After-tax profit (25=22 - 23) 25  
12. Performance of obligations to the State in 20_ 
Unit: million dongs  
 Code Paid in the 
year 
Total of taxes and other contributions to the State 01  
VAT tax on domestic goods   
Excise tax   
12. Implementation of legal capital share 
(For FDI enterprises) 















Total (01=02+06) 01    
Vietnam Partner (02=03+04+05) 02    
Of which:      
State-owned enterprises 03    
Non state-owned enterprises 04    
Other partners 05     
Foreign Partner 06    
Of which: Code    
Country………………..     
Country………………..     
Country………………..     
Country………………..     
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Appendix 2. Detailed Description of Sub-Indices and Component Indicators 
1. Entry Costs 
 % of firms waiting over 01 months to start a business 
 % of firms waiting over 03 months to start a business 
 Effective land wait days (determined by government efforts, not supply/demand 
conditions 
 Length of business registration in days 
 Length of business re-registration in days 
 Number of licenses and permits required to operate 
 % of firms having difficulty to obtain all licenses/permits to start a business 
2. Access to land security of business premises  
Land Access  
 % of firms with LURCs or in the process of receiving them  
 If land is easier to obtain, business would expand  
 % of firms without LURCs that rent land from the state sector  
 firm rating of provincial land conversion policies 
 % of total land with LURCs*  
   Security of land tenure  
 Risk of expropriation  
 Perception of fair compensation values  
 Risk of change in lease contract  
 Perception of fair process for disputing changes in lease contracts 
 Duration of tenure 
3. Transparency  
•  Transparency #  
 Transparency of planning documents  
 Transparency of decisions and decrees  
•  Equity and consistency of application  
 Importance of “relationship” to get access to these provincial documents  
 Importance of family and friends when dealing with government officials  
 Negotiations with tax officials are an essential part of doing business  
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•  Predictability and consistency  
 Predictability of local implementation of laws  
 Provinces discuss regulatory changes with firms  
 Quality of services provided by provincial public agencies on business 
consulting on regulatory information  
•  Openness: Assessment of provincial webpage. Note that this is worth 40% of the 
sub-index. 
4. Time requirements for bureaucratic procedures and inspections 
•  Days reduced dealing with bureaucracy since the Enterprise Law  
•  % of firms spending over 10% of time dealing with bureaucracy  
•  Median number of inspections and median tax hours 
 Decrease in inspections since the Enterprise Law 
5. Informal Charges  
•  Informal charges are a major obstacle to doing business  
•  Firms in the same line of business make extra payments  
•  % of firms paying over 10% of revenue in informal charges  
•  Officials use compliance with local regulations to extract rents  
•   Informal charges delivered expected results 
6. SOE Bias (Competition Environment)  
•  Perception of bias toward SOEs  
 Provincial government is biased toward SOEs  
 Provincial government is biased toward equitized companies  
 Provincial attitude toward the private sector  
 Attitude to the private sector is improving  
 Monetary contributions influence attitude toward the private sector  
 Firm rating of provincial equitization effort  
•  Hard indicators of bias toward SOEs  
 The ratio of local SOE share of liabilities to their share of revenue*  
 % change in number of SOEs (2000-2004)*  
 Average proportion of bank loans to state sector* 
7. Proactiveness and creativeness of provincial leadership 
 •  Province is good at working within central laws  
•  Province is creative and clever in solving problems confronting business community  
•  Good initiatives at provincial level but center frustrates 
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•  No initiatives at provincial level  
8. Business support services 
•  Perception of quality of services provided by provincial public agencies  
 Market information and trade promotion  
 Technology and technology-related  
 services  
 Match-making for business partners  
 Export promotion and trade fairs  
 Industrial Zones 
•  Hard indicators of PSD activities  
 Trade fairs held by province (2004-2005)* 
9. Labor Training and Development  
•  Education services provided by provincial public agencies  
•  Labor vocational training services provided by provincial public agencies  
•  Labor exchange services provided by provincial public agencies  
•  Number of vocational schools adjusted for provincial differences in population*  
10. Legal procedures for dispute resolution  
•  Legal system provided mechanism for firms to appeal officials’ corrupt behavior  
•  Firm confidence in legal institution  
•  Use of legal institutions as primary mode of dispute resolution  
•  Number of cases (where claimant was not an SOE or an FIE) per 100 active firms*  
Note The first three soft indicators worth 60% of the sub-index and the last one hard 
indicator worth 40%. 
Notes:  
* denotes component uses only hard data  
# derived from factor analysis  
In all sub-indices, each primary component is given equal weight unless otherwise 
noted 
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Appendix 3. Measure the added value 
Value Added (VA)= Income of employees + Depreciation of fixed assets + Production tax payable + 
Income of the business. 
In which, 
Income of the business.= Net profit + Interest expenses - Income tax expense. 






















   47 
 
Appendix 4. Lagrange test results (xttest0) choose between the POLS model and RE 
 Ln(Revenue) Before-tax earnings Ln(Added values) 
Ratio of added values over 
average capital force 
Model use 9 
component 
norms  
Estimated results: Estimated results: Estimated results: Estimated results: 
                    Var    sd = sqrt(Var)                   Var     sd = sqrt(Var)             Var     sd = sqrt(Var)                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
    
lnrevenue       5.441579       2.332719 Beforetaxear   2.01e+10    141753.2 lnva    2.41e+10       155109.7 Ratiova    9.73e+07    9866.302 
e                   .7629329     .8734603 e                       4.11e+09   64097.69 e        1.38e+10       117286.3 e                8295944    2880.268 
u                    2.099842       1.449083 u                      1.37e+10    117214.9 u         5.63e+09       75038.91 u             9.59e+07   9790.743 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 79902.96 chibar2(01) =  5.4e+05 chibar2(01) =  1.7e+05 chibar2(01) =     6.46 




Estimated results: Estimated results: Estimated results: Estimated results: 
                    Var     sd = sqrt(Var)       Var     sd = sqrt(Var)             Var     sd = sqrt(Var)          Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
  
lnRevenue   5.441579    2.332719 Beforetaxear  2.01e+10   141753.2 lnva       2.41e+10  155109.7 Ratiova    6.626592    2.574217 
e                .7698784       .8774272 e                  4.11e+09        64099.2 e      1.38e+10       117280.4 e                  .8709555    .93325 
u                2.11641       1.454789 u                1.37e+10       117214.4 u       5.63e+09       75055.33 u                 2.376909 1.541723 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 81270.17 chibar2(01) =  5.4e+05 chibar2(01) =  1.7e+05 chibar2(01) =   516.47 








Estimated results: Estimated results: Estimated results: Estimated results: 
 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)  Var     sd = sqrt(Var)  Var     sd = sqrt(Var)    Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
lnrevenue    5.441579       2.332719 Beforetaxear   2.01e+10   141753.2 lnva      2.41e+10     155109.7 ratiova       9.73e+07  9866.302 
e                 .7697848       .8773738 e                4.11e+09       64098.55 e             1.38e+10  117276.3 e              8355519  2890.591 
u        2.116184       1.454711 u            1.37e+10       117214.8 u              5.62e+09  74973.12 u         9.58e+07       9788.029 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 Test:   Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 81166.53 chibar2(01) =  5.4e+05 chibar2(01) =  1.7e+05 chibar2(01) =     6.48 
Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0055 
Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 Prob > chibar2 =   0.0055 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI PCI data for the 2006 – 2014 period 
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Appendix 5: Estimation of the model FE 
Variable Ln(Revenue)  Before-tax earnings Ln(Added values) 
Ratio of added values over 
average capital force 
LnL 0.497*** 0.471*** 812.935*** 708.893** 0.542*** 0.548*** -275.700*** -266.203*** 
LnK 0.099*** 0.133*** -243.938 -149.907 0.416*** 0.402*** 120.646*** 107.499*** 
Enterprise Age -0.004** 0.041*** 46.449 256.730** -0.004 -0.029*** 17.731 2.190 
(Enterprise Age)
2
 0.001 -0.001*** 0.466 -3.573 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.364 -0.028 
State-owned 
Enterprise 0.018 -0.137** -15963.805*** -16519.269*** -0.232 -0.202 -268.736 -222.291 
Private enterprise 0.024 -0.021 -5496.736* -5699.929* -0.163* -0.165* -105.959 -90.190 
Super small 
enterprise 0.038 0.030 1471.212 1414.100 0.173*** 0.144** -92.593 -120.782 
Small-sized 
enterprise 0.070*** 0.051** 994.186 945.152 0.164*** 0.155*** -88.279 -101.672 
Medium-sized 
enterprise 0.030 0.024 3927.218** 3907.690** 0.075 0.067 -11.602 -27.837 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fishery 0.030 0.008 -19568.168*** -19663.219*** -0.340 -0.348 -15.663 -10.787 
Mining -0.055 -0.077 -426.030 -535.743 0.108 0.086 231.138 261.476 
Industry 0.117*** 0.094*** -72.478 -181.192 0.088 0.101 58.046 78.562 
Construction 0.142*** 0.124*** 264.316 225.183 0.032 0.033 48.884 47.787 
Retail 0.237*** 0.215*** 842.569 764.576 -0.079 -0.075 -0.311 2.600 
Transportation 0.029 0.020 265.679 242.460 -0.100 -0.095 -59.885 -52.775 
Service -0.049 -0.038 237.204 289.944 -0.344*** -0.359*** -12.329 -31.360 
Information 0.059 0.050 785.876 714.730 -0.278*** -0.281*** 101.861 101.877 
Finance -0.313*** -0.408*** -62.717 -353.379 -0.318** -0.255* 32.355 104.001 
Real Estate -0.215*** -0.236*** 1504.638 1483.018 -0.066 -0.076 132.789 118.448 
Science -0.002 -0.004 390.998 397.598 0.101 0.095 72.288 66.252 
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Appendix 5: Estimation of the model FE (cont.) 
Variable Ln(Revenue)  Before-tax earnings Ln(Added values) 
Ratio of added values over 
average capital force 
Electricity production and 
distribution 0.093 0.056 -6345.357 -6361.261 0.935* 0.949* -22.906 -0.149 
Water Supplies 0.024 0.012 -2351.343 -2429.155 0.351** 0.364** 88.127 109.926 
Red River Delta -0.059*** -0.087*** -544.898 -53.990 1.103 -0.309 1072.848 439.615 
Northern mountainous area -0.142*** -0.146*** -189.382 197.705 0.658 -0.100 117.759 45.576 
Central Coast -0.064*** -0.112*** -138.597 -75.749 0.103 -0.191 1058.758 234.897 
Central Highlands -0.040** -0.140*** 410.147 19.938     
Southeast area -0.188*** -0.139*** -973.371 -371.149 -0.062 -0.238 1663.181 74.781 
Mekong River Delta -0.095*** -0.069*** -35.646 78.849 0.143 0.157*** -305.140 -80.222** 
Entry costs -0.022***   28.622                0.160*   34.575                
Access to land -0.036***   368.645*                0.114   1071.342*                
Transparency -0.036***   122.453                -0.114   2624.584**                
Time costs 0.051***   -5.821                0.017   -143.684                
Informal costs 0.007**   79.517                0.260**   -370.773                
Proactiveness and 
creativeness -0.025***   -481.222***                0.029   -570.672                
Labor training 0.043***   -262.136                -0.468**   -672.917                
Legal procedures 0.013***   280.060*                -0.237   -172.878                
Supporting services 0.022***   381.744*                0.438***   1060.440*                
Composite PCI   0.005***   35.025   -0.016***   57.954*** 
Intercept 5.444*** 4.901*** 2101.518 2130.374 -0.069 3.098*** -18329.655*** -3434.583*** 
Number of observation 1001753 1001753 1011473 1011473 437672 437672 437672 437672 
Coefficient of determination 0.089 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.256 0.010 0.002 
Note: *,**,*** means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance respectively. 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI PCI data for the 2006 – 2014 period. 
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LnL 0.471*** 712.664** 0.548*** -266.600*** 
LnK 0.132*** -151.423 0.401*** 107.899*** 
Enterprise Age 0.040*** 265.128** -0.029*** 2.171 
(Enterprise Age) 
2
 -0.001*** -3.845 0.001*** -0.028 
State-owned enterprise -1.505*** -57661.093*** -2.073 -665.954 
Private enterprise -0.897*** -7475.726 -0.302 -1185.850 
Composite PCI -0.009*** -9.614 -0.018* 42.311 
Composite PCI_State-
owned enterprise 0.023*** 729.148*** 0.030 7.141 
Composite PCI_Non -
State enterprise 0.015*** 28.927 0.002 17.751 
Intercept 5.752*** 4798.371 3.243*** -2464.857 
Number of 
observations 1001753 1011473 437672 437672 
Coefficient of 
determination 0.080 0.000 0.256 0.002 
Control variables for 
enterprise size yes 
yes yes yes 
Control variables for 
business sector 
yes yes yes yes 
Control variables for 
operation region 
yes yes yes yes 
Note: *,**,*** means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level 
of significance respectively. 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI PCI 
data for the 2006 – 2014 period 
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Appendix 6. Hausman test results choose between the RE model and FE 
 Ln(Revenue) Before-tax earnings Ln(Added values) 
Ratio of added values over 
average capital force 
Model use 9 component 
norms 
chi2(36) = 44.60 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1539 
 
chi2(36) = 47.07 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1024 
 
chi2(35) = 15.51 
Prob>chi2 = 0.9982 
 
chi2(35) = 14.78 
Prob>chi2 = 0.9989 
 
Model use composite PCI 
chi2(29) = 41.27 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0652 
 
chi2(29) = 0.00 
Prob>chi2 = 1 
 
chi2(27) = 18.69 
Prob>chi2 = 0.8812 
 
chi2(27) = 12.02 
Prob>chi2 = 0.9942 
 
Model use Interactions  
between composite PCI 
and Business Type 
chi2(30) = 24.13 
Prob>chi2 = 0.7661 
 
chi2(30) = 25.71 
Prob>chi2 = 0.6898 
 
chi2(29) = 43.10 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0823 
 
chi2(29) = 22.90 
Prob>chi2 = 7811 
 
Sources: Calculated by the authors from GSO Enterprise Survey data and VCCI PCI data for the 2006 – 2014 period 
 
 
